

Bath & North East Somerset Council

MEETING:	Council	
MEETING DATE:	13th July 2017	
TITLE:	Treasury Management Outturn Report 2016/17	
WARD:	All	
AN OPEN PUBLIC ITEM		
List of attachments to this report: Appendix 1 – Performance Against Prudential Indicators Appendix 2 – The Council’s Investment Position at 31 st March 2017 Appendix 3 – Average monthly rate of return for 2016/17 Appendix 4 – The Council’s External Borrowing Position at 31 st March 2017 Appendix 5 – Counterparty Update Appendix 6 – Arlingclose’s Economic & Market Review of 2016/17 Appendix 7 – Interest & Capital Financing Budget Monitoring 2016/17 Appendix 8 – Summary Guide to Credit Ratings		

1 THE ISSUE

- 1.1 In February 2012 the Council adopted the 2011 edition of the CIPFA Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice, which requires the Council to approve a Treasury Management Strategy before the start of each financial year, review performance during the year, and approve an annual report after the end of each financial year.
- 1.2 This report gives details of performance against the Council’s Treasury Management Strategy and Annual Investment Plan for 2016/17.

2 RECOMMENDATION

The Council agrees that:

- 2.1 the 2016/17 Treasury Management Report to 31st March 2017, prepared in accordance with the CIPFA Treasury Code of Practice, is noted.
- 2.2 the 2016/17 Treasury Management Indicators are noted.

3 RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

- 3.1 The financial implications are contained within the body of the report.

4 STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS AND BASIS FOR PROPOSAL

4.1 This report is for information only.

5 THE REPORT

Summary

5.1 The average rate of investment return for the 2016/17 financial year is 0.47%, which is 0.14% above the benchmark rate.

5.2 Performance against the Treasury Management & Prudential Indicators agreed as part of the annual Treasury Management Strategy is provided in Appendix 1. The outturn position and all treasury activity undertaken during the financial year is within the limits agreed by Council in February 2016 as shown in **Appendix 1**, as well as the CIPFA Code of Practice and the relevant legislative provisions.

Summary of Returns

5.3 The Council's investment position as at 31st March 2017 is given in **Appendix 2**. In line with the Annual Investment Strategy, investments were mainly temporary short term investments made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements.

5.4 The Council is the accountable body for the West of England Revolving Investment Fund (RIF) and received grant funding of £57 million at the end of the 2011/12 financial year. The Council acts as an agent and holds these funds on behalf of the West of England Local Enterprise Partnership until they are allocated in the form of repayable grants to the constituent Local Authorities to meet approved infrastructure costs. Since these funds are invested separately from the Council's cash balances and have been placed short term with the Debt Management Office and other Local Authorities, they are excluded from all figures given in this report. The value of the fund at the end of 2017/18 was £29.0 million.

5.5 Gross interest earned for 2016/17 totalled £367k. Net interest, after deduction of amounts due to Schools, the West of England Growth Points, CHC and other internal balances, is £340k. **Appendix 3** details the investment performance, showing the average rate of interest earned over this period was 0.47%, which was 0.14% above the benchmark rate of average 7 day LIBID + 0.05% (0.33%).

Summary of Borrowings

5.6 The Council's external borrowing as at 31st March 2017 totalled £124.0 million and is detailed in Appendix 4. £12m of short-term borrowing matured during the final quarter of 2016/17 and £10m of PWLB borrowing was arranged to the fund acquisition of investment property as outlined in the budget. Further funds of £4.0m were borrowed for 12 months at beneficial rates of 0.5%.

5.7 The Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) as at 31st March 2017 was £200.1 million. This represents the Council's underlying need to borrow to finance capital expenditure, and demonstrates that the borrowing taken to date relates to funding historical capital spend.

5.8 The Authority's chief objective when borrowing has been to strike an appropriately low risk balance between securing low interest costs and achieving cost certainty

over the period for which funds are required, with flexibility to renegotiate loans should the Authority's long-term plans change being a secondary objective.

- 5.9 The premium charge for early repayment of PWLB debt remained relatively expensive for the loans in the Authority's portfolio and therefore unattractive for debt rescheduling activity. No rescheduling activity was undertaken as a consequence.
- 5.10 Following Local Government Reorganisation in 1996, Avon County Council's residual debt is administered by Bristol City Council. All successor Unitary Authorities make an annual contribution to principal and interest repayment, for which there is a provision in the Council's revenue budget. The amount of residual debt outstanding as at 31st March 2017 apportioned to Bath & North East Somerset Council is £12.860m. Since this borrowing is managed by Bristol City Council and treated in the Council's Statement of Accounts as a deferred liability, it is not included in the borrowing figures referred to in paragraph 5.6.

Strategic & Tactical Decisions

- 5.11 **Appendix 5** provides further information on issues impacting on investment counterparties.
- 5.12 To increase diversification, throughout 2016/17 the Council invested in AAA rated Money Market funds, Local Authorities, UK Banks and very highly rated Foreign Bank counterparties (AA-).
- 5.13 The Council continues to not hold any direct investments with banks in countries within the Eurozone reflecting both on the underlying debt issues in some Eurozone countries and the low levels of interest rates. The Council's investment counterparty list does not currently include any banks from Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Italy.

Future Strategic & Tactical Issues

- 5.14 Our treasury management advisors economic and market review for 2016/17 is included in **Appendix 6**.
- 5.15 The Bank of England base rate was reduced to 0.25% on 4th August 2016. In the opinion of the Council's treasury advisors there is unlikely to be a rate rise until Q3 2020, with the risks to this forecast remain weighted to the downside. In their June "Economic and Interest Rate Forecast Report" their view is the UK is heading for a soft patch or recession, but the likely depth of this should be more limited than the last as the global backdrop, whilst moribund, is not as desperate as at the end of the last decade.
- 5.16 The benefits of the Council's current policy of internal borrowing are monitored regularly against the likelihood that long term borrowing rates are forecast to rise in future years. The focus is now on the rate of increase and the medium-term peak.
- 5.17 The borrowing that has taken place in 2016/17 is therefore driven by a need to maintain an appropriate working cash balance rather than any immediate changes to interest rates.

Budget Implications

5.18 A breakdown of the revenue budget for interest and capital financing and the actual year end position is included in **Appendix 7**. This shows an overall underspend of £778k in 2016/17, reflecting savings from capital programme slippage delaying the need to borrow and a lower Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) requirement.

This position will be kept under review during the new financial year, taking into account the Council's cash-flow position and the timing of any new borrowing required.

6 RATIONALE

6.1 The Prudential Code and CIPFA's Code of Practice on Treasury Management requires regular monitoring and reporting of Treasury Management activities.

7 OTHER OPTIONS CONSIDERED

7.1 None.

8 CONSULTATION

8.1 Consultation has been carried out with the Cabinet Member for Finance and Efficiency, Section 151 Finance Officer and Monitoring Officer.

9 RISK MANAGEMENT

9.1 The Council's lending & borrowing list is regularly reviewed during the financial year and credit ratings are monitored throughout the year. All lending/borrowing transactions are within approved limits and with approved institutions. Investment and borrowing advice is provided by our Treasury Management consultants Arlingclose.

9.2 The CIPFA Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice requires the Council nominate a committee to be responsible for ensuring effective scrutiny of the Treasury Management Strategy and policies. The Corporate Audit Committee carries out this scrutiny.

9.3 In addition, the Council maintains a risk register for Treasury Management activities, which is regularly reviewed and updated where applicable during the year.

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Background papers	<i>2016/17 Treasury Management & Investment Strategy</i> <i>1st & 3rd Quarter Treasury Performance Reports (Cabinet)</i> <i>Half yearly Treasury Performance Report (Cabinet & Council)</i>
Please contact the report author if you need to access this report in an alternative format	

APPENDIX 1

Performance against Treasury Management Indicators agreed in Treasury Management Strategy Statement

1. Authorised limit for external debt

These limits include current commitments and proposals in the budget report for capital expenditure, plus additional headroom over & above the operational limit for unusual cash movements.

	2016/17 Prudential Indicator	2016/17 Actual as at 31st Mar. 2017
	£'000	£'000
Borrowing	266,000	124,004
Other long term liabilities	2,000	0
Cumulative Total	268,000	124,004

2. Operational limit for external debt

The operational boundary for external debt is based on the same estimates as the authorised limit but without the additional headroom for unusual cash movements.

	2016/17 Prudential Indicator	2016/17 Actual as at 31st Mar. 2017
	£'000	£'000
Borrowing	229,000	124,004
Other long term liabilities	2,000	0
Cumulative Total	231,000	124,004

3. Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure

This is the maximum amount of total borrowing which can be at fixed interest rate, less any investments for a period greater than 12 months which has a fixed interest rate.

	2016/17 Prudential Indicator	2016/17 Actual as at 31st Mar. 2017
	£'000	£'000
Fixed interest rate exposure	229,000	100,004

4. Upper limit for variable interest rate exposure

While fixed rate borrowing contributes significantly to reducing uncertainty surrounding interest rate changes, the pursuit of optimum performance levels may justify keeping flexibility through the use of variable interest rates. This is the maximum amount of total borrowing which can be at variable interest rates.

	2016/17 Prudential Indicator	2016/17 Actual as at 31st Mar. 2017
	£'000	£'000
Variable interest rate exposure	141,000	20,000*

* The £20m of LOBO's are quoted as variable rate in this analysis as the Lender has the option to change the rate at 6 monthly intervals (the Council has the option to repay the loan should the rate increase).

5. Upper limit for total principal sums invested for over 364 days

This is the maximum amount of total investments which can be over 364 days. The purpose of this indicator is to control the Council's exposure to the risk of incurring losses by seeking early repayment of its investments.

	2016/17 Prudential Indicator	2016/17 Actual as at 31st Mar. 2017
	£'000	£'000
Investments over 364 days	50,000	0

6. Maturity Structure of borrowing

This indicator is set to control the Council's exposure to refinancing risk.

	Upper Limit	Lower Limit	2016/17 Actual as at 31st Mar. 2016
	%	%	%
Under 12 months	50	Nil	24*
12 months and within 24 months	50	Nil	0
24 months and within 5 years	75	Nil	10
5 years and within 10 years	100	Nil	0
10 years and above	100	Nil	90

* The CIPFA Treasury management Code now requires the prudential indicator relating to Maturity of Fixed Rate Borrowing to reference the maturity of LOBO loans to the earliest date on which the lender can require payment, i.e. the next call date (which are at 6 monthly intervals for the £20m of LOBO's). However, the Council would only consider repaying these loans if the Lenders exercised their options to alter the interest rate.

7. Average Credit Rating

The Council has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to credit risk by monitoring the weighted average credit rating of its investment portfolio. A summary guide to credit ratings is set out at **Appendix 7**.

	2016/17 Prudential Indicator	2016/17 Actual as at 31st Mar. 2017
	Rating	Rating
Minimum Portfolio Average Credit Rating	A-	AA+

8. Liquidity

The Council has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to liquidity risk by monitoring the amount of cash available to meet unexpected payments within a rolling three month period, without additional borrowing.

	2016/17 Prudential Indicator	2016/17 Actual as at 31st Mar. 2017
Total cash available within 3 months	£15m	£17.9m

APPENDIX 2

The Council's Investment position at 31st March 2017

The term of investments, from the original date of the deal, are as follows:

	Balance at 31st Mar. 2017
	£'000's
Notice (instant access funds)	12,856
Up to 1 month	0
1 month to 3 months	5,000
Over 3 months	21,000
Total	38,856

The investment figure of £38.86 million is made up as follows:

	Balance at 31st Mar. 2017
	£'000's
B&NES Council	8,826
LGF	24,856
West Of England Growth Points	134
Schools	5,039
Total	38,856

The following fixed term investments were undertaken during 2016/17 with a maturity date in the following financial year:

Institution	Amount	Rate	Start Date	Maturity Date	Long Term Credit Rating
LLOYDS	5,000	0.60%	11-Apr-16	11-May-17	A
ROTHERHAM MBC	5,000	0.32%	17-Feb-17	30-Apr-17	-
WEST DUNBARTONSHIRE COUNCIL	5,000	0.60%	28-Apr-16	28-Apr-17	-
LANCASHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL	3,000	0.60%	03-May-16	28-Apr-17	-
LANCASHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL	3,000	0.30%	11-Nov-17	11-May-17	-
LEEDS CITY COUNCIL	5,000	0.35%	13-Jul-16	12-Jul-17	-
Total	£26.0m				

The balance of £12.9m and was held in call accounts and money market funds as at 31st March 2017.

Chart 1: Council Investments as at 31st March 2017 (£38.9m)




Chart 2: Council Investments as at 31st December 2016 (£60.1m)




Chart 3: Council Investments per lowest equivalent Long Term credit rating (£38.9m) 31st March 2017





Chart 4: Council Investments per lowest equivalent Long Term credit rating (£60.1m) 31st December 2016



APPENDIX 3

Average rate of return on investments for 2016/17

	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Ave. for Period
Average rate of interest earned	0.45%	0.52%	0.52%	0.52%	0.51%	0.49%	0.48%	0.48%	0.45%	0.40%	0.39%	0.37%	0.47%
Benchmark = 7 Day LIBID + 0.05% (LIBID Source - Arlingclose)	0.41%	0.42%	0.41%	0.41%	0.36%	0.33%	0.31%	0.29%	0.28%	0.27%	0.26%	0.25%	0.33%
Performance against Benchmark %	0.04%	0.10%	0.11%	0.11%	0.15%	0.16%	0.17%	0.19%	0.17%	0.13%	0.13%	0.12%	0.14%

APPENDIX 4

Councils External Borrowing at 31st March 2017

Lender	Amount	Start Date	Maturity Date	Interest Rate
PWLB	10,000,000	15/10/04	15/10/35	4.75%
PWLB	5,000,000	12/05/10	15/08/35	4.55%
PWLB	5,000,000	12/05/10	15/08/60	4.53%
PWLB	5,000,000	05/08/11	15/02/31	4.86%
PWLB	10,000,000	05/08/11	15/08/29	4.80%
PWLB	15,000,000	05/08/11	15/02/61	4.96%
PWLB	5,300,000	29/01/15	08/04/34	2.62%
PWLB	5,000,000	29/01/15	08/10/64	2.92%
PWLB	19,704,175	20/06/16	01/05/41	2.36%
PWLB	10,000,000	24/02/17	24/08/39	2.38%
KBC Bank N.V*	5,000,000	08/10/04	08/10/54	4.50%
KBC Bank N.V*	5,000,000	08/10/04	08/10/54	4.50%
Eurohypo Bank*	10,000,000	27/04/05	27/04/55	4.50%
Gloucestershire County Council	5,000,000	25/11/14	25/11/19	2.05%
Gloucestershire County Council	5,000,000	19/12/14	19/12/19	2.05%
East Dorset District Council	2,000,000	20/03/17	20/03/2018	0.50%
Christchurch Borough Council	2,000,000	20/03/17	20/03/2018	0.50%
TOTAL	124,004,175			3.64%

*All LOBO's (Lender Option / Borrower Option) have reached the end of their fixed interest period and have reverted to the variable rate of 4.50%. The lender has the option to change the interest rate at 6 monthly intervals, however at this point the borrower also has the option to repay the loan without penalty.

APPENDIX 5

Counterparty Update (Provided by Arlingclose)

Credit background: Various indicators of credit risk reacted negatively to the result of the referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union. UK bank credit default swaps saw a modest rise but bank share prices fell sharply, on average by 20%, with UK-focused banks experiencing the largest falls. Non-UK bank share prices were not immune, although the fall in their share prices was less pronounced.

Fitch and Standard & Poor's downgraded the UK's sovereign rating to AA. Fitch, S&P and Moody's have a negative outlook on the UK. Moody's has a negative outlook on those banks and building societies that it perceives to be exposed to a more challenging operating environment arising from the 'leave' outcome.

None of the banks on the Authority's lending list failed the stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority in July and by the Bank of England in November, the latter being designed with more challenging stress scenarios, although Royal Bank of Scotland was one of the weaker banks in both tests. The tests were based on banks' financials as at 31st December 2015, 11 months out of date for most. As part of its creditworthiness research and advice, the Authority's treasury advisor Arlingclose regularly undertakes analysis of relevant ratios - "total loss absorbing capacity" (TLAC) or "minimum requirement for eligible liabilities" (MREL) - to determine whether there would be a bail-in of senior investors, such as local authority unsecured investments, in a stressed scenario

APPENDIX 6

Annual Economic Review 2016/17 (Provided by Arlingclose)

Economic background: Politically, 2016/17 was an extraordinary twelve month period which defied expectations when the UK voted to leave the European Union and Donald Trump was elected the 45th President of the USA. Uncertainty over the outcome of the US presidential election, the UK's future relationship with the EU and the slowdown witnessed in the Chinese economy in early 2016 all resulted in significant market volatility during the year. Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which sets in motion the 2-year exit period from the EU, was triggered on 29th March 2017.

UK inflation had been subdued in the first half of 2016 as a consequence of weak global price pressures, past movements in sterling and restrained domestic price growth. However the sharp fall in the Sterling exchange rate following the referendum had an impact on import prices which, together with rising energy prices, resulted in CPI rising from 0.3% year/year in April 2016 to 2.3% year/year in March 2017.

In addition to the political fallout, the referendum's outcome also prompted a decline in household, business and investor sentiment. The repercussions on economic growth were judged by the Bank of England to be sufficiently severe to prompt its Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to cut the Bank Rate to 0.25% in August and embark on further gilt and corporate bond purchases as well as provide cheap funding for banks via the Term Funding Scheme to maintain the supply of credit to the economy.

Despite growth forecasts being downgraded, economic activity was fairly buoyant and GDP grew 0.6%, 0.5% and 0.7% in the second, third and fourth calendar quarters of 2016. The labour market also proved resilient, with the ILO unemployment rate dropping to 4.7% in February, its lowest level in 11 years.

Following a strengthening labour market, in moves that were largely anticipated, the US Federal Reserve increased rates at its meetings in December 2016 and March 2017, taking the target range for official interest rates to between 0.75% and 1.00%.

Financial markets: Following the referendum result, gilt yields fell sharply across the maturity spectrum on the view that Bank Rate would remain extremely low for the foreseeable future. After September there was a reversal in longer-dated gilt yields which moved higher, largely due to the MPC revising its earlier forecast that Bank Rate would be dropping to near 0% by the end of 2016. The yield on the 10-year gilt rose from 0.75% at the end of September to 1.24% at the end of December, almost back at pre-referendum levels of 1.37% on 23rd June. 20- and 50-year gilt yields also rose in Q3 2017 to 1.76% and 1.70% respectively, however in Q4 yields remained flat at around 1.62% and 1.58% respectively.

After recovering from an initial sharp drop in Q2, equity markets rallied, although displaying some volatility at the beginning of November following the US presidential election result. The FTSE-100 and FTSE All Share indices closed at 7342 and 3996 respectively on 31st March, both up 18% over the year. Commercial property values fell around 5% after the referendum, but had mostly recovered by the end of March.

Money market rates for overnight and one week periods remained low since Bank Rate was cut in August. 1- and 3-month LIBID rates averaged 0.36% and 0.47% respectively during 2016-17. Rates for 6- and 12-months increased between August and November, only to gradually fall back to August levels in March, they averaged 0.6% and 0.79% respectively during 2016-17.

APPENDIX 7

Interest & Capital Financing Costs – Budget Monitoring 2016/17 (Outturn)

April 2016 to March 2017	YEAR END POSITION			ADV/FAV
	Budgeted Spend or (Income) £'000	Actual Spend or (Income) £'000	Actual over or (under) spend £'000	
Interest & Capital Financing				
- Debt Costs	5,403	4,468	(935)	FAV
- Internal Repayment of Loan Charges	(6,200)	(5,564)	636	ADV
- Ex Avon Debt Costs	1,240	1,239	(1)	FAV
- Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP)	4,115	3,783	(332)	FAV
- Interest on Balances	(194)	(340)	(146)	FAV
Sub Total - Capital Financing	4,365	3,587	(778)	FAV

APPENDIX 8

Summary Guide to Credit Ratings

Rating	Details
AAA	Highest credit quality – lowest expectation of default, which is unlikely to be adversely affected by foreseeable events.
AA	Very high credit quality - expectation of very low default risk, which is not likely to be significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events.
A	High credit quality - expectations of low default risk which may be more vulnerable to adverse business or economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings.
BBB	Good credit quality - expectations of default risk are currently low but adverse business or economic conditions are more likely to impair this capacity.
BB	Speculative - indicates an elevated vulnerability to default risk, particularly in the event of adverse changes in business or economic conditions over time.
B	Highly speculative - indicates that material default risk is present, but a limited margin of safety remains. Capacity for continued payment is vulnerable to deterioration in the business and economic environment.
CCC	Substantial credit risk - default is a real possibility.
CC	Very high levels of credit risk - default of some kind appears probable.
C	Exceptionally high levels of credit risk - default is imminent or inevitable.
RD	Restricted default - indicates an issuer that has experienced payment default on a bond, loan or other material financial obligation but which has not entered into bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up procedure, and which has not otherwise ceased operating.
D	Default - indicate an issuer that has entered into bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up procedure, or which has otherwise ceased business.